Nigeria’s evolving security environment requires more than conventional counterterrorism operations. The possibility of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats has made specialised detection, emergency preparedness and coordinated response increasingly important, particularly around airports, seaports, border crossings, transport terminals and other critical national infrastructure.
Through the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), under the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the Federal Government is strengthening the institutional framework for anticipating and responding to complex security threats. This responsibility involves cooperation with security agencies, regulatory authorities, emergency responders and international partners to improve national preparedness.
CBRN threats require a specialised approach because their consequences can extend beyond the immediate location of an incident. The unauthorised movement of radioactive materials, chemical substances or biological agents can endanger public health, disrupt transportation and create serious national security challenges.
Consequently, Nigeria’s countermeasures must combine trained personnel, reliable detection equipment, intelligence-sharing arrangements and clearly defined emergency-response procedures.
Understanding the CBRN Security Challenge
CBRN refers to four categories of potentially dangerous materials and threats: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear.
Chemical threats involve toxic industrial chemicals or other hazardous substances capable of causing serious injury or death. Biological threats include harmful pathogens and biological agents that can affect humans, animals or the environment.
Radiological threats involve radioactive materials that may be released or used to expose people to harmful radiation. Nuclear threats involve nuclear material, weapons or related incidents with potentially severe consequences.
Although these threats differ, they share a common security requirement: authorities must be able to identify suspicious materials, assess the level of danger and coordinate an appropriate response.
National transit hubs deserve particular attention because they facilitate the movement of passengers, cargo and commercial goods. Airports, seaports, land borders and major transport facilities can therefore become important points for detecting unauthorised movement of dangerous materials.
However, effective screening cannot depend on equipment alone. Personnel must understand how detection systems work, recognise potential warning signs, preserve evidence and communicate findings to the appropriate technical and regulatory authorities.
NCTC’s Role in Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Architecture
The NCTC coordinates national counterterrorism policy and supports cooperation among institutions responsible for addressing terrorism and related security threats.
Its responsibilities include intelligence coordination, operational support, training, policy development and collaboration with domestic and international partners.
The Centre’s Directorate of Training and Operations is responsible for fulfilling its training and operational requirements, while its technical and intelligence structures contribute to wider threat assessment and response coordination.
CBRN preparedness fits within this wider responsibility because terrorist organisations and criminal networks may exploit hazardous materials, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and gaps in inter-agency cooperation.
The Centre’s Strategic Plan 2025–2030 identifies institutional capacity-building and international partnerships as important priorities. It also recognises the value of specialised training and cooperation with international organisations and security institutions.
Nevertheless, the national CBRN response is not controlled by the NCTC alone. Agencies such as the Nigeria Police Force, Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority, customs authorities, emergency-management institutions and other relevant organisations have specialised responsibilities.
The effectiveness of the national framework therefore depends on clear institutional mandates and the ability to coordinate their activities during an incident.
Specialised Training: Building Nigeria’s CBRN Detection Capacity
One of the clearest publicly documented indicators of Nigeria’s CBRN capacity-building effort is the training of 30 Nigeria Police Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal and CBRN officers in 2022.
The two-week practical capacity-building workshop was organised through collaboration involving the Nigeria Police Force, the Office of the National Security Adviser and the United States Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling, Detection, and Deterrence.
The 30 participating officers were drawn from across the country and received training in the operation and maintenance of Mobile Detection System equipment.
The programme covered the use of mobile detection vans and handheld devices, detection of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials and secondary inspection techniques.
This training was particularly relevant to strengthening the ability of police personnel to identify radioactive materials that may be outside regulatory control.
It also demonstrated the importance of combining equipment acquisition with practical instruction. Detection systems are only useful when trained officers can operate them correctly, interpret their readings and follow established procedures when suspicious materials are identified.
The 30 officers represent a documented training figure for the 2022 police programme. It should not be presented as the total number of CBRN-trained personnel across Nigeria or as an NCTC-only training count.
Five Mobile Detection Vans and Specialised Radiation Equipment
Equipment deployment is another important component of Nigeria’s CBRN preparedness.
In April 2022, the Nigeria Police Force disclosed that its EOD-CBRN Command had received five Mobile Detection System vans, alongside specialised radiation detection and monitoring equipment.
The disclosed equipment included:
- Five Mobile Detection System vans.
- Three Radio-isotope Identification Devices.
- Three PackEye Radiation Detection Backpacks.
- Three Radiation Survey Meters.
- Seven Sensor Technology Radiation Pagers.
- Two spare-parts and maintenance kits.
The equipment was intended to strengthen the detection of radioactive materials and improve the ability of officers to conduct secondary inspections.
The Inspector-General of Police also directed that the equipment be strategically deployed to sensitive and critical infrastructure locations and areas considered vulnerable to security threats.
This represents an important documented equipment milestone in Nigeria’s national radiation-detection capacity.
However, the published announcement did not provide a complete location-by-location deployment register. It would therefore be inaccurate to claim that all five vans or the other devices have been confirmed as operationally deployed at specific airports, seaports or other named transit hubs.
A more detailed public deployment record would help establish how the equipment is distributed, which agencies operate it and how effectively it supports national screening and incident-response arrangements.
Strengthening Inter-Agency Cooperation on Nuclear Security
CBRN preparedness requires cooperation between security agencies and technical regulators because identifying dangerous materials is only one part of the response.
The Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) plays an important role in regulating nuclear and radioactive materials, while the National Nuclear Security Coordination Centre supports coordination on nuclear security matters.
On November 26, 2025, the NNRA’s National Nuclear Security Coordination Centre and the NCTC held a high-level meeting at the Office of the National Security Adviser in Abuja to strengthen cooperation.
The discussions addressed knowledge-management systems, crime-scene handling involving radioactive or nuclear materials, inter-agency coordination and funding constraints affecting operations.
The NCTC Coordinator, Major General Adamu Garba Laka, emphasised the need for Nigeria to remain prepared against the growing risks associated with nuclear and radiological materials.
Both institutions reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening national nuclear security arrangements and improving structured cooperation.
This engagement is significant because incidents involving radioactive materials require technical expertise that security personnel may not possess independently. Regulatory authorities must help identify the materials, assess potential exposure and support appropriate handling procedures.
The partnership also demonstrates why a coordinated national response is necessary. No single institution can independently manage every technical, security, medical and environmental dimension of a serious CBRN incident.
Expanding Specialised Capacity Through International Partnerships
Nigeria’s CBRN preparedness has also benefited from international technical cooperation.
On July 23, 2026, the Nigeria Police Force, the Office of the National Security Adviser and the United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency completed the final phase of a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction curriculum-development workshop for the Police EOD-CBRN Command.
The initiative followed a train-the-trainers approach intended to institutionalise specialised knowledge and incorporate C-WMD training into police capacity development.
The workshop focused on strengthening the Force’s ability to prevent, detect, respond to and investigate chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive threats.
Its emphasis on developing a standard training curriculum is important because specialised knowledge must extend beyond a limited number of officers. A sustainable training system can help build institutional competence, improve consistency and prepare additional personnel to respond to emerging threats.
The programme also highlighted the importance of continued cooperation between Nigerian institutions and international partners in specialised equipment procurement, technical assistance and advanced training.
Protecting Airports, Seaports and Other Critical Infrastructure
National transit hubs require particular attention because of the volume of passengers, cargo and commercial activity passing through them.
Airports handle international and domestic passenger movements, while seaports receive large volumes of imported goods and industrial materials. Land borders and other transport corridors also facilitate movement across national boundaries.
CBRN preparedness at these locations requires more than routine security checks. Authorities need appropriate detection systems, trained operators, reliable referral procedures and arrangements for isolating suspicious materials without creating unnecessary public exposure.
Coordination between security agencies, customs authorities, radiation regulators and emergency responders is equally important.
When a potentially dangerous material is identified, the response must establish who has authority to assess it, who is responsible for securing the area and which technical institution should determine the appropriate next steps.
The NCTC’s coordination role can contribute to this wider framework by encouraging information-sharing and cooperation between institutions responsible for national security.
However, public reporting should distinguish between equipment acquired, equipment assigned to agencies, equipment deployed at particular facilities and equipment confirmed to be operational. These are different stages of implementation.
Measuring Progress: Training, Equipment and Operational Readiness
Nigeria’s CBRN preparedness should be assessed through measurable indicators rather than announcements of equipment acquisitions alone.
The 30 officers trained in the 2022 Mobile Detection System programme provide a documented personnel figure. The five detection vans and associated radiation-monitoring devices provide a documented equipment inventory.
The 2026 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction curriculum-development initiative demonstrates continued attention to institutional training.
Nevertheless, publicly available records reviewed for this article do not establish a consolidated NCTC-specific total of personnel trained in CBRN detection, the number of transit hubs equipped with operational CBRN systems or the number of CBRN detection deployments conducted across the country.
These reporting gaps matter because they make it difficult to assess the actual coverage of national preparedness.
Authorities could improve transparency by publishing periodic information on the number of personnel trained by agency, equipment availability, maintenance status, designated screening locations and inter-agency exercises completed.
Such reporting would also help identify areas where additional training, equipment or technical support is required.
Building a Stronger National Response to Complex Threats
Nigeria’s efforts to strengthen CBRN countermeasures reflect the changing nature of national security risks. As threats become more technically complex, the country must ensure that its security institutions possess the knowledge, equipment and coordination systems required to detect and respond effectively.
The NCTC’s cooperation with the NNRA and wider security architecture, the training of 30 police EOD-CBRN personnel, the acquisition of five Mobile Detection System vans and the 2026 C-WMD curriculum-development initiative provide documented examples of this broader national effort.
The next priority is to translate these investments into measurable operational readiness across critical infrastructure, including airports, seaports and border facilities.
Ultimately, protecting national transit hubs against CBRN threats requires sustained investment in trained personnel, functioning detection equipment, technical regulation and inter-agency coordination. With clearer deployment records and regular performance reporting, Nigeria can strengthen public confidence in its preparedness while building a more resilient national security system.
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